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Recent Developments 
Huffman v. State 
Home Improvement Contractors Operating without a License Are Subject to 
Prosecution for Each Individual Transaction 
I n a case of first impression, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland held that a home 
improvement contractor could be 
charged criminally for each individual 
transaction that the contractor enters 
into without a license. Huffman v. 
State, 356 Md. 622, 741 A.2d 1088 
(1999). In so holding, the court 
determined that the intent of the 
legislature in drafting Section 8-601 
ofthe Business Regulation Article of 
the Annotated Code of Maryland, was 
to charge multiple violations of that 
statute individually. The court 
concluded that the plain language of 
the statute supported this 
detennination. 
Between September 11, 1995, 
and December 18, 1996, petitioner 
James Ralph Huffman ("Huffman") 
entered into home improvement 
contracts with eight different 
homeowners. During this time period, 
Huffman accepted deposits and 
began work under each of the eight 
contracts. He failed, however, to 
complete any of the jobs and did not 
return any of the deposits. Moreover, 
Huffman was not licensed by the 
Maryland Home Improvement 
Commission to perform these home 
improvements as required. 
As a result ofHuffinan's failure 
to complete any of the jobs or return 
any of the deposits, he was charged 
with eight separate counts of violating 
By Christopher Mason 
§ 8-601 ("acting as [a] contractor or 
subcontractor or selling a home 
improvement without [a] license"). 
Huffinan was convicted in the Circuit 
Court for Harford County on seven 
of the eight counts, with the State 
entering anal prosequi on count eight. 
In an unreported opinion, the 
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland 
affirmed his convictions based on the 
plain language of § 8-601. The Court 
of Appeals of Maryland granted 
certiorari to determine whether 
Huffman's actions constituted one 
continuing violation of § 8-601, or 
seven separate violations. 
The court of appeals began its 
analysis by asserting that the legislative 
intent of the statute is pivotal to a 
determination of whether specific 
continuing behavior constitutes 
multiple violations of a single statutory 
offense. Huffman v. State, 356 Md. 
622,627-28,741 A.2d 1088,1091 
(citing Richmondv. State, 326 Md. 
257, 261, 6.04 A. 2 d 483, 485 
(1992)). The court was determined 
to use a common sense approach by 
giving the language of the statute its 
ordinary meaning. Id. at 628, 741 
A.2dat 1091. 
With these principles of statutory 
construction laid out before it, the 
court examined § 8-601(a), which 
states in pertinent part: "[ e ]xcept as 
otherwise provided in this title, a 
person may not act or offer to act as 
a contractor in the State unless the 
person has a contractor license." Id. 
The court, in construing the statute 
according to its plain language, 
concluded that a violation of § 8-601 
req uires two elements: 1) an 
individual must act as a contractor 
and 2) that act must be completed 
without a license. Id The court then 
looked to the Maryland Home 
Improvement Law for the definition 
of "contractor." Id. at 629, 741 
A.2d at 1092. Section 8-101 (c) 
defines a "contractor" as "a person 
who performs or offers or agrees to 
perform a home improvement for an 
owner." Id. The court concluded 
that the intent of the legislature was 
to classify each transaction with a 
separate owner as an independent 
act of the contractor. Id. It relied on 
the use of the singular articles "a" and 
"an" before "home improvement" 
and "owner," respectively, as a basis 
for its conclusion. Id. To suggest 
otherwise, the court reasoned, 
"ignores the plain language of § 8-
101 (c) and the fundamental rules of 
grammar." Id. 
The court of appeals next 
examined the statute "in the context 
within which it was adopted." Id. at 
630, 741 A.2d at 1092 (quoting 
Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Mohler, 
318 Md. 219,225,567 A.2d,929, 
934 (1990)). The title of the original 
statute, enacted in 1962, indicates 
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that the legislature fashioned the 
Maryland Home Improvement Law 
with the intention of, "providing 
generally for the regulation of the home 
improvement business of all persons 
in this State, establishing a system of 
licensing certain contractors and 
salesman under a new administrative 
agency to be known as the Maryland 
Home Improvement Commission; .. 
. [and] providing criminal penalties 
regarding home improvement 
transactions." ld. (citing 1962 Md. 
Laws Chap. 133). Based on this 
language the court of appeals opined 
that the purpose of the Maryland 
Home Improvement Law was to 
provide criminal penalties for each 
home improvement transaction 
entered into without a license. ld. 
Huffman relied on Reddick v. 
State, 219 Md. 95, 148 A.2d 384 
(1959), and People v. Hays, 234 Cal. 
App.3d Supp. 22,286 Cal. Rptr. 462 
(1991), to support the claim that his 
conduct constituted only one violation 
of§ 8-601. ld. at630-31, 741 A.2d 
at 1092. In Reddick, it was 
determined that the State did not need 
to plead or prove that the defendant 
intended to defraud a particular 
person in order to satisfY the intent to 
defraudelementofforgery. ld. at631, 
741 A.2d at 1092-93. Instead, a 
simple showing of an intent to defraud 
the general public satisfied the 
applicable pleading requirements. ld. 
at631, 741 A.2dat 1093. In Hays, 
the court held that the determination 
of whether a victim is necessary for 
one to commit the crime of acting as 
a contractor is a question of fact to 
be determined on a case by case basis. 
ld. (citing Hays, 234 Cal.App.3d 
30.2 U. Bait L.F. 72 
Supp. 22, 286 Cal. Rptr. 462, 464 
(1991)). 
Based on these cases, Huffman 
argued that he could be prosecuted 
for only one violation under § 8-601 
for making an offer to the general 
public; and therefore, a singular victim 
cannot be used as the unit of 
prosecution. Id. at631-32, 741 A.2d 
at 1093. The court of appeals 
determined Huffinan' s argument was 
inapplicable because it did not 
address the issue in the present case. 
ld. at 632, 741 A.2d at 1093. 
Moreover, the court concluded that 
since the case at bar was not 
concerned with offers to the general 
public, the cases relied on by Huffinan 
were irrelevant. ld. 
Huffman also relied on State v. 
Carlisle, 28 S.D. 169, 132 N.W. 686 
(1911), and Wilson v. 
Commonwealth, 119 Ky. 769, 82 
S.W. 427 (1904), in which it was held 
that certain criminal statutes created 
continuing offenses. ld. The court of 
appeals rejected this argument 
because the statutes at issue in 
Carlisle and Wilson addressed 
completely unrelated subject matter 
and were not similarly worded. ld. 
at 633, 741 A.2d· at 1093-94. 
Moreover, the court reasoned that the 
decisions in Carlisle and Wilson did 
not take into account the Maryland 
legislature's intent in enacting the 
Maryland Home Improvement Law, 
and, therefore, were unpersuasive to 
the instant case. ld. at633, 741 A.2d 
at 1093. 
Through its holding, the court of 
appeals was true to the legislature's 
intent when it enacted § 8-601 and 
the Maryland Home Improvement 
Law in 1962. The court concluded 
that the Maryland legislature, through 
the specific language selected by it for 
each statute, clearly intended home 
improvement contractors to be 
charged criminally for each separate 
transaction they enter into without a 
license. 
TIle holding in Huffman v. State 
will affect both prosecutors and 
private attorneys. Prosecutors will 
now be able to charge multiple 
violations for each separate 
transaction a contractor enters into 
without a license. This will, in tum, 
give them more leverage in obtaining 
a guilty plea. Similarly, attorneys who 
represent companies or individuals 
who perform home improvements 
must, now more than ever, remind 
their clients to keep their licenses 
current. 
Additionally, this holding strikes 
a blow for future home improvement 
customers in Maryland. As the 
phenomenon of Hom'e Depot, 
Lowe's, and the entire home 
improvement industry continues to 
grow, the precedent set by this court 
should reduce the number of 
inexperienced, unlicensed contractors 
performing home improvements. 
Consequently, this should abate the 
number of lawsuits brought by 
disgruntled homeowners hoping to 
save a few dollars by hiring a friend 
of a friend of a friend. 
